Search for: All records

Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs) have the potential to enhance traffic safety and efficiency. In contrast, aligning both vehicles’ utility with system-level interests in scenarios with conflicting road rights is challenging, hindering cooperative driving. This paper advocates a game theory model, which strategically incorporates deceptive information within incomplete information vehicle games, operating under the premise of imprecise perceptions. The equilibria derived reveal that CAVs can exploit deceptive strategies, not only gaining advantages that undermine the utility of the other vehicle in the game but also posing hazards to the overall benefits of the transportation system. Vast experiments were conducted, simulating diverse inbound traffic conditions at an intersection, validating the detrimental impact on efficiency and safety resulting from CAVs with perception uncertainties, and employing deceptive maneuvers within connected and automated transportation systems. Finally, the paper proposes feasible solutions and potential countermeasures to address the adverse consequences of deception in connected and automated transportation systems. It concludes by calling for integrating these insights into future research endeavors and pursuing to fully realize the potential and expectations of CAVs in enhancing the whole traffic performance.